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Careful readers of FOMC communi-
cations will note that in addition to
talking about actual inflation, the
committee often talks about inflation
expectations. Sandra Pianalto, the
president and chief executive officer
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, explains the important role that
inflation expectations play in the
monetary policy process. This Com-
mentary is taken from a speech she
delivered to the Copper Development
Association’s Global Market Trends
Conference on September 8, 2006.
T he Federal Open Market Committee,
or FOMC, decided to keep the federal
funds rate target unchanged at its last
meeting on August 8. Although I cannot
speak for any of my colleagues on the
Committee, two factors were behind 
my decision to support a pause at that
meeting. 
First, while the elevated inflation num-
bers concerned me, and indeed they 
still do, the overall pace of economic
activity—especially housing activity—
had begun to moderate, and the full
effect of the FOMC’s previous rate
increases had not yet been felt. I viewed
a pause as appropriate because I wanted
the chance to accumulate more informa-
tion before judging whether additional
policy firming would be needed. 
Another important element in my think-
ing was the stability of inflation expecta-
tions. I will quote directly from the 
minutes of the August 8 meeting here:
“Following 17 consecutive policy firm-
ing actions, members generally saw 
limited risk in deferring further policy
tightening that might prove necessary, 
as long as inflation expectations
remained contained.”
Why should inflation expectations 
matter so much to the FOMC? Congress
has mandated that the Federal Reserve
control inflation, of course, but also that
it promote maximum sustainable
growth. And it so happens that when
inflation expectations are managed
well—specifically, when they are
anchored, the central bank—the Federal
Reserve—can best promote sustainable
economic growth. 
■ The Difference between
Inflation and a Relative
Price Increase 
Let me begin by making a crucial dis-
tinction between inflation and a relative
price increase. People often see price
increases in some of the items they buy
and assume that a period of inflation has
begun. However, inflation is a condition
that affects all prices, not just the price of
particular goods or services. 
Consider copper prices. As of yesterday,
copper prices were roughly seven times
higher than they were in 1965. I might
conclude that the cost of obtaining cop-
per is now seven times higher than it 
was 40-some years ago. But we all know
that’s not true.
The truth is that, despite large swings up
and down, the relative price of copper—
that is, its price relative to the average of
all prices, based on the Consumer Price
Index—tended to fall for much of the
period from the mid-1970s through
2001. Over the past several years, the
relative price of copper has shot up, of
course, but even with this sharp increase,
the relative price is nowhere near seven
times its 1965 level. 
Copper prices have not risen that much
more than all prices, on average. The fact
is that all prices, on average, have risen
fivefold in the past 40 years. This fivefold
increase in all prices is inflation. 
A relative price increase is quite different
from inflation. Changes in relative prices
reflect changes in the supply and demand
conditions of specific markets. Inflation
reflects something else altogether. 
It’s true that the two are not always so
easy to tell apart. Sometimes, we experi-
ence such a large and persistent relative
price change that it temporarily ripples
through the inflation data. The obvious
example is energy prices.
Today, energy prices are greatly increas-
ing the costs faced by virtually every
business and household in our country.
Purchasing the same amount of gasoline
or heating oil as we did a couple of years
ago requires us either to earn more, save
less, or purchase fewer nonenergy items.
Adjusting to higher energy prices
requires us to make real sacrifices. The
Federal Reserve cannot offset these
costs because we do not create oil. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve can
control inflation over the medium to
longer term. While we can’t increase the
supply of oil, we do control the supply
of money. And that means we controlthe average price level over time. To
paraphrase a famous economist, Irving
Fisher, the average price level doesn’t
rise because of the goods; it rises
because of the money. If growth in
money exceeds its demand, its purchas-
ing power will depreciate. This is infla-
tion. It affects all prices and wages, and
ultimately it has only one origin, the
central bank. The central bank is solely
responsible for managing the nation’s
money supply. 
Appreciating the distinction between
inflation and a relative price increase
helps one understand the need for mea-
sures of “core” inflation, like the core
CPI or the core PCE (personal con-
sumption expenditures). Core inflation
measures attempt to strip away the most
volatile relative price movements—like
food and energy—which may temporar-
ily cause an aggregate price measure to
fluctuate in a way that does not reflect a
persistent change in the purchasing
power of money. Measures of core
inflation are useful metrics for the cen-
tral bank, and perhaps only the central
bank, to monitor.
I think most people recognize the
importance of allowing individual
prices to move up and down relative to
one another. At the same time, I think
that most people would agree that
allowing the value of our money to
depreciate over time is bad for eco-
nomic prosperity. But just what is it
about inflation that is so costly? Well, it
turns out that the lasting harm to our
economy comes when a sustained
period of inflation changes inflation
expectations. 
■ Why Anchoring Inflation
Expectations Is Important to
Prosperity
Back in 1968, Milton Friedman warned
economists and policymakers not to try
to stimulate economic growth at the cost
of “just a little more” inflation. He pre-
dicted that people would come to antici-
pate that little bit of extra inflation and
then would change their behavior in var-
ious ways. If policymakers still
expected people to behave as they had
in the past, they would attempt to do
things that were no longer possible. In
effect, Friedman was warning policy-
makers not to treat inflation expecta-
tions as a static concept, but to appreci-
ate the interdependence of inflation and
inflation expectations.
Unfortunately, the economic events of
the 1970s bear out Friedman’s warning.
Households and businesses did adjust
their behavior to minimize the costs they
faced from rising inflation. And once
inflation expectations became unglued,
we watched with dismay as the costs
arising from inflation expectations took a
huge toll on our resources. The economy
spiraled into “stagflation”—an environ-
ment of worsening economic perfor-
mance and higher inflation. 
Let’s consider some of the ways that ris-
ing inflation expectations can hinder
economic performance. For example, we
know that people who fear higher infla-
tion often choose to put their wealth into
real assets, such as land, gold, silver, or
copper. They do this not so much as a
traditional business investment, but as a
hedge against a rising price level. So as
the expectation of inflation grows, these
asset prices will likely reflect two things:
the value of the asset in production and
its value as an inflation hedge. This alters
the flow of our scarce resources from
their best use.
Of course, this is just one example of the
damage that an inflationary psychology
inflicts on our economy. When people
begin to anticipate a decline in the pur-
chasing power of their dollars, they will
take many actions to protect themselves.
They will use their time and wealth to try
to minimize the amount of money they
hold because that money is slowly losing
its purchasing power. Inflation also
raises the effective tax rate that people
pay on income they earn from investing
and saving. This, in turn, induces people
to forgo investments and discourages
them from saving.
Inflation also makes it difficult for bor-
rowers and lenders, who now must eval-
uate the future purchasing power of
money, not just the real terms of a con-
tract. The costs associated with making
these predictions rise with inflation
because higher levels of inflation are
generally more volatile and more diffi-
cult to predict. As inflation becomes
more unpredictable, lenders demand
insurance against this risk in the form of
higher interest rates. This makes long-
term contracts, particularly financial
contracts, more costly than they would
be if inflation weren’t a concern. 
People can also make costly mistakes as
they try to distinguish between changes
in relative prices and inflation. If infla-
tion is highly unpredictable, entrepre-
neurs may assume that all price changes
are the result of the inflationary policies
of the central bank and ignore some
important relative price signals telling
them to adjust their business plans. 
All of the actions that people take to
guard against inflation consume pre-
cious resources that would be used more
productively in a world where people
didn’t have to worry about inflation.
These are the costs that that a central
bank must keep in check if our economy
is to achieve its full potential. 
■ The Measurement and 
Theory of Inflation 
Expectations
Well, it’s one thing to understand that
you want to keep inflation expectations
in check, but it is an entirely different
matter knowing when, in fact, they are
in check. Let me explain some of the
ways we attempt to measure inflation
expectations.
We can look for changes in inflationary
sentiment in a variety of indicators.
Asset markets give us some indirect
measures. For example, we can track the
price movements of any number of
investment goods, such as metals and
other commodities, or real estate, or any
tangible asset that investors might see as
a “safe haven” from inflation. 
We can also monitor the behavior of
long-term interest rates relative to short-
term rates, otherwise known as “the
yield curve.” A steepening of the yield
curve—that is, a rise in long-term rates
relative to short-term rates—might sig-
nal that bond buyers are demanding
some protection against inflation. 
A relatively new and promising measure
comes from comparing the yields on
Treasury Inflation Indexed Securities,
commonly known as TIPS, and regular
Treasury securities. TIPS give an
investor a fixed real return because the
principal and interest payments are tied
to the Consumer Price Index. Regular
Treasury securities are not tied to the
CPI, so we can look at the difference in
the rates of return between the two secu-
rities to infer how much inflation
investors might expect to see over differ-
ent time horizons—for example, over
the next 5 to 10 years. (Research at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland sug-
gests there is a risk premium in the TIPS
market, which is likely to fluctuate andcomplicate an accurate interpretation of
the inflationary sentiment coming from
financial markets. See “Expected Infla-
tion and TIPS,” Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, Economic Commentary,
2005.)
The problem with financial market indi-
cators is that asset prices respond to any
number of risks, not just inflation. In a
world that is always confronting and
evaluating risks, disentangling the infla-
tion risk from all the other risks is a
very imperfect science. Nevertheless,
financial market indicators are proving
to be a useful yardstick for monitoring
inflation expectations.
You might think that a better way to
gauge inflation expectations would be
to simply ask people their views on
inflation. In fact, there is a survey that
does just that. Once a month, the Uni-
versity of Michigan interviews about
500 households around the nation, ask-
ing people how much they think prices
will rise in the next 12 months and over
the next 5 to 10 years. Here, too, there
are some problems with interpreting the
raw data. For one thing, the beliefs of
households about future inflation are
typically much higher than the actual
inflation rate. 
Also, investigations into the survey data
have revealed some fascinating pat-
terns. For example, people are likely to
report their inflation predictions in
terms of whole numbers, and particular
whole numbers at that. It turns out that
people are far more likely to report that
they expect 0, 3, or 5 percent inflation
than 1, 2, or 4 percent. 
Research at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland also reveals sharply differ-
ent perspectives on future inflation
across demographic groups. Women, on
average, tend to have higher inflation
expectations than men, the poor higher
than the rich, and the young and elderly
higher than the middle-aged. 
These patterns in the survey responses
may be more than just an intellectual
curiosity. When you get right down to
it, we really know very little about how
people form their inflation expectations.
To what extent are expectations based
on past inflation experience versus
looking into the future? Do people
scour all of the available data to predict
inflation, or do they just consider the
information most readily available to
them? And, perhaps most important,
how do people act on the inflation
expectations that we measure through
the household surveys? 
There is much at stake in the answers to
these questions. We might discover
important differences between house-
hold survey information and financial
market data. We may also find an
answer to one of the great questions—
and obstacles—in the monetary policy
process. Namely, are inflation expecta-
tions responsible for the long time it
takes for monetary policy actions to
show up in the inflation data? 
Understanding what lies behind our
measures of inflation expectations could
greatly enhance the design and conduct
of monetary policy. For example, it
could help us understand what types of
institutional arrangements and commu-
nication policies help the central bank
retain credibility for meeting its price
stability objective, even when large and
persistent relative price changes ripple
through the inflation data. 
To that end, unlocking some of the mys-
teries about inflation expectations may
help central banks decide whether, and
how, to incorporate a numerical infla-
tion objective into the monetary policy
process. Some central banks have used
these numerical objectives as a tool to
help anchor inflation expectations.
Economists refer to a numerical infla-
tion objective as a “commitment
device,” that is, a means for holding a
central bank’s feet to the fire. That may
be so. But whether or not there is an
explicit numerical objective, anchoring
inflation expectations requires a central
bank to keep inflation low and stable, to
reinforce its commitment to price stabil-
ity, and to clearly communicate its poli-
cies in pursuit of that commitment.
I welcome research that helps us learn
about the strengths and weaknesses of
various communication tools and strate-
gies designed to keep inflation expecta-
tions firmly anchored. This is a research
agenda and a discussion that is now
under way in the Federal Reserve, and I
am excited to be engaged in it. 
■ Conclusion 
I hope that I have given you a better
understanding of why it is so important
for the Federal Reserve to anchor infla-
tion expectations. Inflation is what the
Federal Reserve can control—not the
price of oil or copper or any other com-
modity. By anchoring the inflation
expectations of households and busi-
nesses, we will help sustain the pros-
perity that generations of Americans
have come to enjoy. And as we learn
more about how inflation expectations
are formed, we can do our job as mone-
tary policymakers even better. 
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